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Abstract 
For adults, loyalty to the group is highly valued, yet little is known about how 
children evaluate loyalty. We investigated children’s attitudes about loyalty in a third-
party context. In the first experiment, 4- and 5-year-olds watched a video of two 
groups competing. Two members of the losing group then spoke. The disloyal 
individual said she wanted to win and would therefore join the other group. The loyal 
individual said she also wanted to win, but would stay with her group. Children were 
then asked five forced-choice questions about these two individuals’ niceness, 
trustworthiness, morality, and deservingness of a reward. Five-year-olds preferred the 
loyal person across all questions; results for 4-year-olds were considerably weaker but 
in the same direction. The second experiment investigated the direction of the effect 
in 5-year-olds. In this experiment, children answered questions about either a loyal 
individual, a disloyal individual, or a neutral individual. Children rated both the loyal 
and the neutral individuals more positively than the disloyal individual across a 
number of measures. Thus, whereas disloyal behavior is evaluated unfavorably by 
children, loyal behavior is the expected norm. These results suggest that, at least from 
the age of five, children understand that belonging to a group entails certain 
commitments. This marks an important step in their own ability to negotiate 
belonging and become trustworthy and reliable members of their social groups. 
 
Keywords: loyalty, group membership, group norms, social-cognitive development, 
morality 
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Stick With Your Group: Young Children's Attitudes About Group Loyalty 
As adults, loyalty to the group is very important to us. We stick with our group 
even when it costs us to do so and, at least at times, we punish individuals who leave 
harshly (e.g., by executing deserters in times of war). Both of these things can be 
explained by the fact that successful cooperation within a group can only take place if 
group members can trust and rely on each other (Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, 
& Herrmann, 2012). Furthermore, each group member contributes to the functioning 
of the group with his or her skills, knowledge, and work, and every defecting group 
member harms the group by taking these valuable resources with them (and maybe 
even contributing them to another group) (Levine & Moreland, 2002). Consequently,, 
the loyalty of every member is important for the survival of the group as a whole. 
Haidt and Graham (2007) even describe loyalty as one of the five psychological 
foundations of morality (see also Haidt, 2007). Thus, group members are expected to 
follow the norm of staying with the group, even when they have to sacrifice personal 
goals in order to benefit the group (Levine & Moreland, 2002). Indeed, Brewer and 
Silver (2000) describe loyalty as the “willingness of group members to exert effort, 
pay costs, or sacrifice personal benefits on behalf of the group as a whole” (p. 162). 
Although it is also possible to feel a sense of loyalty to the group without making any 
such sacrifice, in fact without engaging in any overt behavior at all, the definition 
above describes a situation in which loyalty is visible in a particularly strong form. 
Despite the importance of loyalty to successful group functioning, surprisingly, 
there has been little developmental research on this topic, and no research at all on 
young children’s judgments of people who leave their groups. The few studies on 
related topics investigated children’s reactions to group members who play with or 
say positive things about members of their own versus other groups. Castelli, De 
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Amicis, and Sherman (2007), for example, found that 4- to 7-year-old White children 
prefer White children who play with an in-group member (i.e., a White child) to white 
children who play with an out-group member (i.e., a Black child). In a related series 
of studies, Abrams and colleagues asked 5- to 12-year-old children to judge their in-
group and out-group peers according to their normative vs. deviant statements (i.e., 
saying positive things only about the in-group vs. saying positive things about both 
the in- and out-group). They found that in general children favored normative to 
deviant in-group members (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams, Rutland, 
Cameron, & Ferrell, 2007; Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003; Abrams, 
Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008; Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell, 2009). 
However, none of these studies examined loyalty in the sense of staying with the 
group and thereby paying a cost for the sake of the group (i.e., staying even when 
leaving would be beneficial for the individual). Also, in most of these studies children 
belonged to the groups themselves (see Abrams et al., 2009, for an exception) and 
thus it is possible that they were responding based simply on their positive feelings 
for their own groups, rather than based on an understanding of loyalty more generally. 
Work from other areas has shown that preschool-aged children understand 
something about norms of conduct in social situations, including norms about leaving. 
For example, children realize that when one is committed to participating in a 
collaborative activity with someone else, one cannot just leave in the middle of it 
without taking leave or making some excuse, and more generally they expect 
collaborative partners to stick with each other until the activity is finished (Gräfenhain, 
Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; see also Gräfenhain, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2013). Other research from Hamann, Warneken, and Tomasello (2012) found that 
3.5-year-old children stick to a collaborative activity until both collaboration partners 
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have received their reward. These findings suggest that young children have some 
understanding of the commitments inherent in some types of dyadic interactions. 
However, commitments that come with dyadic interactions might be easier to 
understand than similar types of commitments at the group level (Tomasello et al., 
2012).  
In the current study we tested 4- and 5-year-olds’ understanding of loyalty to 
the group more directly than has been done previously, following the strict definition 
of Brewer and Silver (2000), in which loyal behavior involves a personal sacrifice for 
the benefit of the group. In addition, to rule out the possibility that children were 
responding based on their own positive feelings about their group, and to tap into 
children’s abstract moral reasoning about loyalty in an agent-neutral way, we tested 
children’s judgments of third-party interactions. In line with the previous work of 
Castelli et al. (2007) and Abrams et al. (2003a, 2007, 2009), in which the youngest 
subjects were 4 and 5 years old, respectively, we chose to test 4- and 5-year-olds. 
Recent research has suggested this is an important period for the development of 
intergroup relations (e.g., Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Dunham & Emory, in 
press). 
We asked children to watch a video in which two groups competed with each 
other. The video was paused when it became clear that one of the groups was losing 
the competition. Two members of the losing group then spoke. In counterbalanced 
order, the disloyal individual said she wanted to win and would therefore join the 
other group, whereas the loyal individual said she also wanted to win, but would stay 
with her group. Thus, in the current experiment, losing the competition was the 
sacrifice the loyal individual made to stay with her group (see Baker-Ward, Eaton, & 
Banks, 2005, for evidence that children associate losing with negative emotions).  
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Following the videos, we examined children's attitudes about these two 
individuals by asking them a series of forced-choice questions about niceness, trust, 
morality, and deservingness of rewards. We chose these dimensions to ask about 
based on the following assumptions. First, we predicted that a positive evaluation of 
loyalty should be reflected in a general positive evaluation of the loyal person (i.e., 
perceiving her as a nice person; see Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Colemann, 1993). 
Second, since being able to rely on one’s group members is crucial for successful 
cooperation (Tomasello et al., 2012), we included a question examining trust. We 
were careful to ask about a situation that was unrelated to the competitive group task 
in the video, to assess children’s judgments about the actors’ general trustworthiness 
rather than the likelihood that she would complete that particular task. Third, 
following Haidt and Graham (2007), we were interested in whether children 
understand loyalty as a moral obligation, so we asked which of the two individuals 
did the right thing. Fourth, in line with the differential group inclusion measure of 
Abrams et al. (e.g., 2003a, 2007, 2009, 2011), we investigated children’s predictions 
about how the other group members of the loyal and disloyal individuals would feel 
about those individuals. Finally, we included a question designed to assess how 
deserving children thought the loyal and disloyal individuals were of rewards. This 
question thus investigated whether children’s evaluation of others’ loyalty has any 
consequences for children’s own behavior toward those individuals. For each question 
we asked children to justify their answer, to make sure that their choices were based 
on the individuals’ loyalty or disloyalty, rather than some other factor.  
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Experiment 1a 
In Experiment 1a we investigated whether 5-year-old children value loyal over 
disloyal behavior. We predicted that children would favor the loyal over the disloyal 
person, despite the fact that wanting to win might be seen as a justifiable goal for the 
disloyal individual to have. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 49 five-year-old children (24 girls and 25 boys, 
age range 5;0;09-5;11;26, M=5;5;15). One additional child was tested but excluded 
for failing the memory check at the end of the study. All children (in each experiment 
reported here) were recruited and tested in their daycare centers in a medium-sized 
German city. Children were predominantly White, native German speakers with 
mixed socio-economic backgrounds. 
Materials and design. Children were seated at a table in front of a laptop 
computer (Lenovo ThinkPad, 14” screen) with loudspeakers attached. The 
experimenter sat to the right of the child. Children watched one of two full-screen 
videos depicting two groups of female actors competing to build towers out of plastic 
cups, and then two members of the losing group responding loyally and disloyally, 
respectively. Across the two videos we counterbalanced the identity and the side (left 
or right) of the loyal individual, as well as whether the loyal or the disloyal individual 
spoke first. After watching the video, children were asked a series of five forced-
choice test questions, each with a follow-up justification question. All but one of these 
questions were presented in counterbalanced order: Following a similar type of 
procedure used by Vaish, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2011), the question involving 
distribution of a reward was always presented last, because it was a more active task, 
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with props that could have been distracting to children. There were also two questions 
designed to check children’s memory of what happened in the videos, which were 
presented both before and again after the test questions. 
Procedure. All children were tested by a female experimenter (E), who 
picked them up from their classroom and explained that she wanted to show them a 
video. After sitting them down in front of the laptop, E explained that in the video 
there were two groups, a yellow group and a green group. First of all, they would see 
the yellow group. E started the video and children watched as the four (female) 
members of the yellow group walked into sight from the left side, each of them 
wearing a yellow scarf and a yellow armband. They came to a halt behind a small 
table on the left side, waved to the camera, and one of them said, “We are the yellow 
group!” Then they all gave each other a high five to demonstrate the team spirit of the 
group. At this point E paused the video and said to children, “Look, this is the yellow 
group. All the members of the yellow group are wearing yellow scarves and yellow 
armbands. They are all in the yellow group. Now let’s see the green group.” She 
started the video again and children watched as the four (female) members of the 
green group walked in from the right side and presented themselves to children in 
exactly the same manner. All members of the green group were wearing green scarves 
and armbands (see Figure 1a). E paused the video again and told children, “Look, this 
is the green group. All the members of the green group are wearing green scarves and 
green armbands. They are all in the green group.”  
E then explained, “Now both groups are going to have a tower-building 
contest. Each group will sit at their table and build a tower out of cups. The group 
who is faster, and who has the higher tower in the end, wins.” E restarted the video 
and children watched as the two groups knelt at their tables, upon which 28 large blue 
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plastic cups were scattered upside-down on either side, and prepared for the 
competition. After a start signal, each group began to build a tower out of the cups. It 
was soon clear that the green group was faster and therefore more likely to win (see 
Figure 1b).  
Just before the green group placed their last few cups on the tower, E stopped 
the video again and asked children, “What do you think, which group is going to win?” 
If children answered correctly (“the green group”) she said, “Exactly, the green group 
is going to win, because their tower is much higher already.” If children answered 
incorrectly, she corrected them, saying, “No, look, the green group is going to win, 
because their tower is much higher already.” Before starting the video again, E told 
children, “Now let’s see what the members of the yellow group think about that!”, 
and restarted the video. 
The camera zoomed in on the two members of the yellow (losing) group who 
would become the loyal and disloyal group members, with the green group and their 
tower visible in the background but frozen in mid-action (see Figure 1c). These two 
individuals both looked over to the winning green group and then spoke, in 
counterbalanced order. The loyal individual said, “The green group is winning! I 
would also like to win, but I’ll stay with my yellow group.” The disloyal individual 
said, “The green group is winning! I would also like to win, so I’m going over to the 
green group.” After this, the camera zoomed in more closely, now just featuring the 
loyal and disloyal individuals (see Figure 1d). They both repeated their intentions in 
the same order as for the previous statement: The loyal individual said, “I’ll stay with 
my group!” and the disloyal individual said, “I’m going over to the other group!” The 
video then ended and a still frame of the loyal and disloyal individuals (both with 
neutral facial expressions, looking directly at the camera) remained on the screen for 
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the duration of the question phase. The video was approximately 1 minute, 20 seconds 
in length.  
 
Figure 1. Still shots from the test video. 
 
After the video finished, E asked children two memory questions. First she 
asked, “Who is staying with her group?” If children pointed correctly to the loyal 
group member, E asked the second question, “And who is going into the other group?” 
If children did not point to the correct person in response to the first question, E 
pointed to the correct person and said, “She is staying in her group. And who is going 
into the other group?” After children had pointed to the correct person (they never 
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answered this second question incorrectly), E then asked the five test questions, each 
of which was followed by a justification question: 
1. Nice: “Which one is nicer?” 
Nicer justification: “Why do you think she is nicer?” 
2. Trust: [while showing the child a picture of a hamster] “Look, this is my 
hamster. Cute, isn’t he? But when I go on holiday I can’t take him with 
me. Then I will need someone to take care of my hamster. What do you 
think, which one can I trust to take good care of my hamster?” 
Trust justification: “Why do you think I can trust her more?” 
3. Moral: “Which one is doing the right thing?” 
Moral justification: “Why do you think this was the right thing to 
do?” 
4. Disliked: “Which one do the others in the yellow group not like anymore 
now?” Note that for this question only, in order to answer in favor of the 
loyal person, children had to point to the disloyal person. This question 
was reverse-scored in order to assess the flexibility of children’s 
responding and to help us interpret the degree of consistency in their 
responding.  
Disliked justification: “Why do you think the others don’t like her 
anymore?” 
5. Reward: “Look, I have a beautiful flower that you can give to one of them. 
But first think about who you want to give the flower to. If you want to 
give the flower to her [E pointed to the individual on the left], you can put 
it in here [E placed a little vase in front of the left individual]. And if you 
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want to give the flower to her [E pointed to the right individual], you can 
put it in here.” [E placed another little vase in front of the right individual]. 
Reward justification: “Why did you give the flower to her?” 
 As a response to the forced-choice questions children were expected to point 
to one of the individuals or, in the case of the reward question, to put the flower in 
one of the vases. If children did not respond, or indicated that they did not know the 
answer, E asked the question again with the request “Show me!” If children still did 
not respond, the question was posed again and E pointed to the individuals herself, 
asking “Her or her?” She always pointed to the person on the left first. If children did 
not answer for the third time, or if they refused to choose one individual (answering 
“both”), E moved on to the next question. For the justification questions, children 
were allowed to answer freely, and if they did not respond they were not probed 
further. During all questions, E remained friendly but neutral and did not provide any 
feedback concerning the correctness of the answers. At the end, E repeated the 
memory questions in order to check whether children remembered the manipulation.  
Coding and reliability. We counted both verbal and pointing responses to the 
memory check and the five test questions, as well as which vase children put the 
flower into for the reward question, and coded children's responses as either loyal (i.e., 
favoring the loyal person) or disloyal (i.e., favoring the disloyal person) for these 
questions. For question 4, which was reversed, children's responses were coded as 
favoring the loyal person when they pointed to the disloyal person.  
For all responses we also looked at children’s answers to the corresponding 
justification questions, to see whether they chose the loyal person (or disloyal person 
in question 4) for the hypothesized reasons. For these questions, our main interest was 
in whether children referred to staying with the group or leaving the group. Examples 
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of answers that children gave that counted in this category were “Because she is 
staying with the yellow group” or “Because she did not go to the other group.”  
In addition to coding responses that referenced loyalty/disloyalty, we also 
inspected children’s other justifications and noticed that they sometimes seemed to 
value winning over loyalty. We thus coded responses that referenced winning (or 
losing for question 4), for example, “Because she is winning” or “Because the green 
group is faster.” 
Finally, we coded all the other types of justifications children gave to see what 
additional reasons children gave to explain their choices. Based on the most common 
answers received, we divided these other responses into three further categories: 
liking/disliking (e.g., "Because I like her" or "Because she is nicer"), superficial 
features (e.g., "Because she looks pretty" or "Because she has a nice voice"), and 
other (e.g., "I don't know"; but also nonsense statements such as “Because I want to" 
or "Because my dad told me this"). 
 A second coder who was unaware of both the hypotheses of the study and 
which individual was the loyal vs. disloyal person coded a random 25% of the sample 
for reliability. Reliability for children’s choice as well as for their justification 
answers was excellent, withȡ=1.00 and ȡ=.94, respectively. 
Results 
Memory check. Two of the 49 children failed the memory check at the 
beginning of the test phase (and were corrected). All children included in the sample 
passed the two memory questions at the end of the experiment.  
Forced-choice questions. Our main question of interest was whom children 
chose in response to the five test questions. Visual inspection of the data revealed that 
the order of the questions, the identity of the experimenter who played the loyal 
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person, the side on which she sat, and which of them spoke first had no influence on 
children’s responses. We thus collapsed across these counterbalancing variables and 
do not consider them further.  
For the first three questions requiring a verbal response above, children chose 
the loyal person significantly more often than the disloyal person (see Figure 2): They 
thought that the loyal person was nicer (binomial test, p=.019, g=.18), judged the 
loyal person as more trustworthy (binomial test, p=.04, g=.15), and thought that the 
loyal person did the right thing (binomial test, p=.004, g=.21). For the reverse-scored 
disliked question, in contrast, children chose the disloyal person significantly more 
often than the loyal person, assuming that the yellow group would now dislike the 
disloyal person (binomial test, p=.01, g=.19). For the reward question, a majority of 
the children gave the flower to the loyal person, but this was only a trend (binomial 
test, p=.085). Overall, across all five questions together, children responded 
significantly more often in favor of the loyal person than the disloyal person; 67% of 
the time (t(48)=3.71, p=.001, d=0.53).  
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Figure 2. Forced-choice responses for 5-year-olds in Experiment 1a. 
 
Response patterns. An inspection of children’s response patterns showed that 
55% of children consistently responded in favor of the loyal person (i.e., preferring 
the loyal person in at least four of five questions), 16% consistently responded in 
favor of the disloyal person (i.e., preferring the disloyal person in at least four of five 
questions), and 29% showed no consistent response pattern (i.e., not preferring one 
person clearly over the other).  
Justifications. An additional question of interest was how children justified 
their responses. Below we describe the pattern of justifications given by children. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the different types of justifications children gave 
for both their loyal and their disloyal responses. In the trials in which children 
answered in favor of the loyal person, children justified their responses with reference 
to the actors’ loyal or disloyal behavior in more than half of the trials (55%). 
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Justifications involving liking/disliking, superficial features, and winning/losing made 
up only a small proportion of responses (2%-9% of trials each). The category ‘other’ 
made up only 26% of justifications for loyal responses, compared to 51% for disloyal 
responses. In their justifications of their answers favoring the disloyal person, further 
common responses were references to loyalty/disloyalty (in 22% of trials) and 
winning/losing (19% of trials). 
 
Figure 3. Justifications across all questions for 5-year-olds in Experiment 1a. 
 
Looking at children's justifications for each question separately, it is 
noteworthy that when children answered in favor of the loyal person (see Figure 4a), 
in four out of the five questions, the predominant type of justification that children 
gave involved references to loyalty/disloyalty, with an overall majority of children 
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referring to loyalty/disloyalty in the questions involving niceness (78%) and doing the 
right thing (66%).  
In contrast, when justifying their choices in favor of the disloyal person (see 
Figure 4b), the most common response in all four questions fell into the category 
‘other’, although in four of the five questions a minority of children (20%-36%) did 
mention loyalty/disloyalty. The question that stood out as having a different pattern of 
results was the moral one regarding who did the right thing. When answering that the 
disloyal person did the right thing, 50% of children referred to winning/losing and 
none referred to loyalty/disloyalty. A fair number of children (17%-27%) also 
referred to winning/losing when answering that the others would dislike the loyal 
person and when giving the reward to the disloyal person. 
Figure 4. Justifications for 5-year-olds: a) For loyal responses, b) for disloyal 
responses. 
 
Linking response patterns and justifications. Looking at children’s 
justifications in relation to their consistency in responding to the forced-choice 
questions, it is noteworthy that 89% of the children who consistently answered in 
favor of the loyal person referenced loyalty at least once, compared to only 41% of 
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the children who did not give consistent answers (Χ
2
(1, 49)=12.69, p<.01, Φ=.51). 
This suggests that the children who responded consistently in favor of the loyal 
person really did so based on her loyal behavior. 
Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to examine young children’s attitudes about 
group loyalty. Results showed that 5-year-old children clearly prefer loyal to disloyal 
individuals, and that they do so even when they themselves are not a member of one 
of the groups. Analysis of children’s justifications for their responses showed that 
when children answered in favor of the loyal person, they justified their choice by 
referring to her loyal/disloyal behavior over half of the time. Children were 
particularly likely to reference loyalty/disloyalty when justifying their choice of the 
loyal person in the questions involving niceness and who did the right thing. When 
children chose in favor of the disloyal person, their justifications were more mixed. 
Although they sometimes referenced loyalty/disloyalty or winning/losing, the 
majority of their responses were irrelevant to the test scenario.  
 
Experiment 1b 
Since results with 5-year-olds were so clear, we wondered whether even 
younger children would show a preference for loyal over disloyal behavior in third-
party interactions. In Experiment 1b the same procedure was thus repeated with 4-
year-olds. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 49 four-year-old children (24 girls and 25 
boys, age range 4;0;05-4;11;20, M=4;06;22). One additional child was tested but 
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excluded because of uncooperativeness, and five children had to be excluded for 
failing the memory check at the end of the study.  
Procedure. The design, materials, and procedure of Experiment 1b were 
identical to those in Experiment 1a. 
Coding and reliability. Coding and reliability procedures were also identical 
to those in Experiment 1a. Reliability for children’s choice as well as for their 
justification answers was excellent, with κ=1.00 and ȡ=.93, respectively. 
Results 
Memory check. Nine of the 49 children failed the memory check at the 
beginning of the test phase (and were corrected). All children included in the sample 
passed the two memory questions at the end of the experiment. 
Forced-choice questions. Visual inspection of the data revealed that the order 
of the questions, the identity of experimenter who played the loyal person, the side on 
which she sat, and which of the individuals spoke first had no influence on children’s 
responses, thus we collapsed across these counterbalancing variables.  
The performance of 4-year-olds was weaker than that of 5-year-olds (see 
Figure 6). Although the majority of 4-year-olds responded in favor of the loyal person 
for each question, their results were non-significant in each case (binomial tests for 
nicer, p=.111; for trustworthy, p=.253; for did the right thing, p=.193; for disliked, 
p=.392; for reward, p=.152). However, overall, across all five questions together, 
children responded in favor of the loyal person 60% of the time, and this was 
significantly above chance level (t(48)=2.09, p=.042, d=0.29). 
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Figure 5. Forced-choice responses for 4-year-olds in Experiment 1b. 
 
Response patterns. An inspection of children’s response patterns showed that 
47% of children consistently responded in favor of the loyal person (i.e., preferring 
the loyal person in at least four of five questions), 29% consistently responded in 
favor of the disloyal person (i.e., preferring the disloyal person in at least four of five 
questions), and 24% showed no consistent response pattern (i.e., not preferring one 
person clearly over the other).  
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Justifications. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the different types of 
justifications 4-year-olds gave for both their loyal and their disloyal choices. For each 
type of choice, only around 20% of the children referred to loyalty/disloyalty. 
Winning was mentioned three times as often in justifications for disloyal than loyal 
choices (18% vs. 6%, respectively). For both loyal and disloyal choices, about half of 
the time 4-year-olds justified their choice with ‘other’ responses. 
 
Figure 6. Justifications across all questions for 4-year-olds in Experiment 1b. 
 
Looking at children's justifications for each question separately (see Figures 7 
a and b), the predominant response for 4-year-olds across most questions, both when 
they answered in favor of the loyal person and when they answered in favor of the 
disloyal person, fell into the category ‘other.’ Although 4-year-olds only referenced 
loyalty/disloyalty in a minority of their justifications for their choices favoring the 
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loyal person, it is interesting to note that the three questions that elicited the most 
loyalty/disloyalty justifications for the 4-year-olds were the same three questions that 
elicited the most loyalty/disloyalty justifications for the 5-year-olds: the questions 
involving niceness, doing the right thing, and who the others would dislike. For these 
questions 21%-37% of 4-year-olds produced loyalty/disloyalty justifications. When 
justifying their choices favoring the disloyal person, across all five questions 15%-
21% of children referenced loyalty/disloyalty. Following disloyal choices, the two 
questions that elicited the most winning/losing justifications were also the same 
across age groups: the questions involving who did the right thing and who the others 
would dislike.  
  
Figure 7. Justifications for 4-year-olds: a) For loyal responses, b) for disloyal 
responses. 
 
Linking response patterns and justifications. Looking at children’s 
justifications in relation to their consistency in responding to the forced-choice 
questions, 52% of the children who consistently answered in favor of the loyal person 
referenced loyalty at least once, compared to only 19% of the children who did not 
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give consistent answers (Χ
2
(1, 49)=5.85, p<.05, Φ=.35). This suggests that a subset of 
the children who responded consistently in favor of the loyal person did so based on 
her loyal behavior. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1b showed that 4-year-old children are beginning to show some 
understanding of loyalty, and preference for loyal individuals, when observing third-
party interactions, although their pattern of results was much weaker than that of 5-
year-olds. Still, overall, on a total score comprising all five questions, they responded 
significantly in favor of the loyal person. Further hints that some 4-year-olds are 
starting to understand and value loyalty comes from their justification responses. Just 
over half of the children who consistently favored the loyal person referred to 
loyal/disloyal behavior, suggesting that some subset of 4-year-olds already understand 
and value loyalty.  
It is noteworthy that in both of these experiments (and especially Experiment 
1a), children's attitudes about loyalty did not seem to be very well reflected in their 
responses to the question about reward allocation. One possible reason for this is that, 
for practical reasons this question was always presented last. Thus, children might 
have been less focused on the task at that point. In addition, in hindsight, giving 
flowers might be associated with other things too, such as rewarding a winner. Still, it 
is important to note that at both ages, although results were not significant, they did 
go in the direction of favoring the loyal person for this question as well. 
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that, at least by 5 years of 
age, children clearly value loyalty to the group. However, because we used forced-
choice questions in this Experiment, several open questions remain about the nature 
of children’s understanding, and, in particular, the direction of the effect: Do children 
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favor loyal individuals or disfavor disloyal individuals? We address these questions in 
Experiment 2.  
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, children were forced by the questions to choose between the 
loyal and disloyal individual; thus they could not express equally positive attitudes 
about both, or give flowers to both – they had to choose just one of them. This is 
potentially a weakness as it could be that children naturally have no strong preference 
for loyal individuals but only express a preference when asked to make a choice. 
Therefore, in Experiment 2 we showed children the same videos but changed the 
nature of the test questions, asking children about only one of the individuals (the 
loyal individual for some children and the disloyal individual for others). 
Consequently, across conditions, children could hypothetically express equally 
positive attitudes about both individuals. 
In addition, in this Experiment we investigated the direction of children’s 
responding. That is, in Experiment 1, children’s preferential choices in favor of the 
loyal person could have come about either because they value loyal behavior or 
because they disapprove of disloyal behavior (or both). Thus here we included a 
comparison to a neutral individual who had expressed no loyal or disloyal behavior. 
The comparison to this baseline individual enables us to determine whether loyal 
behavior leads children to see a person as more positive, or whether disloyal behavior 
leads children to see her as more negative, or both. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 96 five-year-old children (48 girls and 48 boys, 
age range 5;0;0-5;09;08, M=5;05;17). Additional children were tested but excluded 
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for the following reasons: uncooperativeness (1), camera malfunction (1), 
experimenter error (6), and failing the memory check at the end of the study (11).  
Materials, design, and procedure. Apart from the test questions, the design, 
materials, and procedure of Experiment 2 were identical to those of Experiment 1 for 
children in the two experimental conditions (i.e., the loyal and disloyal conditions, 
n=32 per condition). However, children in the neutral condition (n=32) watched a 
modified version of the same video in which the still image with the two test 
characters appeared right after the group competition (i.e., after E stopped the video 
and asked children which group they thought would win). Consequently, children in 
the neutral condition did not hear any statements by these individuals at all, and did 
not have to pass the memory check. 
After the video, children were asked a series of five questions, with 
subsequent justification questions, about just one of the individuals. These questions 
were as follows:  
1. Nice: “Do you think she is nice, or not nice?” [while pointing to the relevant 
person] 
Nice justification: “Why do/don’t you think she is nice?” 
2. Trust: [while showing the child a picture of a hamster] “Look, this is my 
hamster. Cute, isn’t he? But when I go on holiday I can’t take him with me. 
Then I will need someone to take care of my hamster. What do you think, can 
I trust her to take good care of my hamster, or can I not trust her?” 
Trust justification: “Why do you think I can/can’t trust her?” 
3. Moral (For this question only, the questions differed across conditions. We 
wanted the question in the experimental conditions to be similar to the 
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question in Experiment 1, and this change was needed in order to make the 
question in the neutral condition make more sense):  
a. Right thing (experimental conditions only): “What do you think, is she 
doing the right thing, or not the right thing?”  
Moral justification: “Why do you think that’s the right thing/not the 
right thing to do?” 
b. Good person (neutral condition): “Do you think she is a good person or 
not a good person?” 
Moral justification: “Why do you think that she is/is not a good 
person?” 
4. Liked: “What do you think, will the others in the yellow group still like her 
now, or not like her anymore?” 
Liked justification: “Why do you think the others will still like 
her/won’t like her anymore?”  
5. Reward: “Look, I have a beautiful flower. If you want to give her the flower as 
a present, you can put it in here [E placed a little vase in front of the respective 
individual]. If you don’t want to give her the flower as a present, you can put 
it in here.” [E placed another little vase some distance away from the laptop]. 
Reward justification: “Why would/wouldn’t you like to give her the 
flower as a present?”  
If children did not answer a test question, they were asked again two more times 
before E moved on to the next question. At the end E repeated the memory questions 
(only in the experimental conditions). 
The identity and the side on which the test characters were presented, as well 
as whether the loyal or disloyal individual spoke first, were counterbalanced as in 
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Experiment 1. The individual E asked about in the neutral condition was 
counterbalanced in a similar way. In addition, we counterbalanced the order of the 
positive vs. negative part of the question across children. That is, half of the children 
in each condition heard the sentence with the positive phrase first (e.g., “Do you think 
she is nice, or not nice?”) and half of the children heard it in the reverse order (e.g., 
“Do you think she is not nice, or nice?”). 
 Coding and reliability. We counted children’s positive (e.g., “nice”) and 
negative (e.g., “not nice”) responses to all questions, as well as which vase children 
put the flower into for the reward question.  
As in the previous experiment, we were interested in whether children judged 
the loyal person positively (in the loyal condition) and judged the disloyal person 
negatively (in the disloyal condition) for the hypothesized reasons, and therefore we 
looked at children's answers to the corresponding justification questions. Responses 
were coded in the same manner as in Experiments 1a and b.  
A second coder who was unaware of both the hypotheses of the study and 
which individual (in the experimental conditions) was the loyal vs. disloyal person 
coded a random 25% of the sample for reliability. Reliability was excellent, with κ = 
1.00 for the test questions, and κ = .95 for the justifications. 
Results 
Memory check (experimental conditions only). Two of the 64 children in 
the experimental conditions failed the memory check at the beginning of the test 
phase (and were corrected). All children included in the sample passed the two 
memory questions at the end of the experiment.  
Test questions. Visual inspection of the data revealed that the order of the 
questions, the identity and side of the test person, which of the two individual spoke 
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first, and the order of the positive and negative part of the question had no influence 
on the responses. We thus collapsed across these counterbalancing variables.  
First, we calculated an ANOVA on an overall score summing across all five 
questions. It revealed significant differences in children’s responses across conditions 
(F(2)=3.90, p=.024, η2=.077). Post-hoc Fisher’s LSD tests showed that children 
responded more positively to the loyal (p=.011) and the neutral individual (p=.032) 
than to the disloyal individual. There was no significant difference in their responses 
to the loyal and neutral individuals (p=.676; see Figure 8). 
Looking at each of the five questions individually, chi-square tests revealed 
significant differences for children’s responses to three of the questions. Children 
judged the loyal and neutral individuals as nice (χ
2 
(2, 96)=6.13, p=.047, φ=.25), as 
trustworthy (χ
2 
(2, 96)=6.95, p=.031, φ=.27), and as doing the right thing/being a good 
person (χ
2 
(2, 93)=10.43, p=.005, φ=.34) more often than they did this for the disloyal 
individual. There were no significant differences for the other two questions (for 
disliked, χ
2 
(2, 95)=.88, p=.65; for reward, χ
2 
(2, 96)=.80, p=.67). 
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Figure 8. Positive responses to the test questions in Experiment 2. 
 
Justifications. Figure 9 shows the distribution of the different types of 
justifications children gave for their positive and negative responses in each condition. 
In the two most relevant situations (i.e., positive response to loyal person, negative 
response to disloyal person), children referred to loyalty/disloyalty at relatively high 
rates. However, they also gave justifications of the category ‘other’ at quite high rates 
in all cases in this study too. In the neutral condition, they never referred to 
loyalty/disloyalty. Since the individuals in these children’s video never mentioned 
that they would like to stay or leave the group, this is not surprising. Instead, in this 
condition children often referred to superficial features of the individuals or their 
liking/disliking for them. In addition, occasionally children in the neutral condition 
referred to the individuals’ scarf color or group membership. These were coded under 
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‘superficial features.’ Across all three conditions, children rarely mentioned 
winning/losing.  
 
Figure 9. Justifications for positive and negative responses in Experiment 2. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicates and extends the results from Experiment 1a. Taken 
together, these two Experiments show that 5-year-old children prefer loyal to disloyal 
individuals, and do so not only in a forced-choice situation, but also when given the 
chance to evaluate each individual on her own. This experiment also provided 
important information about how, exactly, children see loyal and disloyal individuals. 
The similar results found in the loyal and neutral conditions suggest that children see 
loyalty to the group as normal and expected – they showed no increased preference 
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for the loyal person compared to a neutral person. Rather, it appears that children’s 
disapproval of disloyal behavior is what drove the effects we found, as they judged 
the disloyal person more negatively than both the loyal and the neutral person in most 
cases. Again, children's justifications confirmed that at least some of the children 
could additionally explain their decision with reference to loyal behavior.  
It is worth noting that, although children judged the disloyal person more 
negatively than both the loyal and the neutral person, for the most part it was not the 
case that children answered negatively (for example, saying “not nice”) for the 
disloyal person. Rather the disloyal person was judged negatively relative to the other 
two individuals. The morality question was a notable exception here: In this case, the 
majority of children answered negatively about the disloyal individual. It is still 
possible to argue, however, that overall children negatively evaluated the disloyal 
individual. Based on a number of studies demonstrating a positivity bias in children 
(see, e.g., Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Heyman & Giles, 2004), we did not necessarily 
expect children’s positive responses to the neutral person to be around 50% (e.g., for 
children to be equally likely to evaluate her as ‘nice’ or ‘not nice’). In line with these 
previous results, we found that children generally judged the neutral person quite 
positively. Thus, children's evaluation of the neutral person serves as a sort of 
calibration point for judging the extent to which children viewed the disloyal 
individual negatively. 
General Discussion 
The aim of these experiments was to examine young children’s understanding 
of, and attitudes about, loyalty, in the sense of sticking with one’s group even when it 
is costly to do so. The findings of Experiment 1 demonstrate that 5-year-old children 
clearly understand and value loyal behavior. Not only do they judge loyal behavior as 
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the right way to act, they infer that loyal individuals are nicer, more trustworthy, and 
more likely to be liked by other members of the group than are disloyal individuals. 
The number of different situations in which children preferred loyal individuals 
highlights the consistency and breadth of the effect. Four-year-old children also seem 
to be beginning to understand and value loyalty, as evidenced by their overall result, 
but the results from their individual questions were considerably weaker. Experiment 
2 replicated and extended the findings for 5-year-olds and, in addition, demonstrated 
the direction of the effect, namely that disloyal behavior is evaluated negatively, 
whereas loyal behavior appears to be the expected norm (i.e., it is not evaluated any 
differently from neutral behavior). 
This is the first time that children’s preference for individuals who stay with 
their group has been shown within an agent-neutral set-up, in which children were not 
involved in one of the groups themselves. The loyal and disloyal individuals’ actions 
neither harmed nor benefited children personally, but still children evaluated the 
disloyal person more negatively. In addition, we showed that children value loyalty 
more than winning, and thus seem to understand that loyalty can involve a personal 
sacrifice for the group.  
The findings of Experiment 2 suggest that children see loyalty as the norm and 
disloyalty as a deviation from acceptable behavior. It is interesting to note that a 
similar pattern of results is found in other studies of moral behavior. For example, 
Vaish, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2010) found that children helped a harmful actor 
less often than a neutral or prosocial actor, but did not help a prosocial actor more 
often than a neutral one. Similarly, Hamlin and Wynn (2012) found that when 
deciding what novel food they would like to eat, 16-month-old children took into 
account food preferences of prosocial and neutral individuals equally, but not of 
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antisocial individuals. Children's increased sensitivity towards negative compared to 
positive events has been described in terms of the so-called negativity bias (e.g., 
Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008). Thus, the current study provides additional 
evidence for a negativity bias in children's moral development (for related findings 
see also Abrams et al., 2003b; Doebel & Koenig, 2013; and Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 
2006). 
These findings bring up several avenues for future research. For example, it 
would be interesting to study children’s understanding of loyalty in different 
situations. By using a competitive situation in which one group was winning, we 
operationalized loyal behavior in a strong form. Rhodes and Brickman (2011) have 
found that children see more obligations attached to group membership when there is 
competition between groups. Therefore it is likely that children in the current study 
viewed it as important that group members stayed with their group, since the group’s 
chances of winning declined further with every member who defected. On the other 
hand, winning is also highly valued and thus defection might be more understandable 
in this context than in other contexts. In future work it will be important to clarify the 
role of competition and winning in children’s judgments of loyalty. Research with 
adults also suggests additional factors that might influence loyalty, such as a threat to 
the group (Branscombe et al., 1993), identification with the in-group (e.g., Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1997), status and performance of the group, and stability of the 
group over time or permeability of boundaries (see Levine & Moreland, 2002). It 
would be interesting to look at these more nuanced aspects of loyalty in young 
children and thus build a more complete picture of the situations in which they 
understand and value loyalty. 
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It will also be important to further investigate the development of children’s 
attitudes about loyalty and disloyalty. Although the pattern of results of the 4-year-
olds in our study was somewhat weaker than that of the 5-year-olds, certain aspects of 
our data lead us to believe that there may be a gradual development of children’s 
understanding and attitudes rather than a qualitative change between age four and five. 
For example, the analysis linking justifications and consistency of responding across 
questions suggests that a subset of the 4-year-olds already valued loyalty. Thus it is 
likely that at least some children's attitudes about loyalty start developing before the 
age of four. Also, since not all 5-year-olds seemed to value loyalty equally strongly, 
development of these attitudes clearly continues beyond the age of five. It is 
interesting to speculate about what might drive this development. One possibility 
might be that as children gain more experience with group life (e.g., in kindergarten) 
and as their attachments to their groups become stronger (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011; 
Nesdale & Flesser, 2001; Patterson & Bigler, 2006), their earlier understanding of 
commitments from dyadic, cooperative contexts (e.g., Gräfenhain et al., 2009, 
Hamann et al., 2012) gets extended to the group level. In this context it will also be 
interesting to investigate children’s own feelings of loyalty to the group. Preliminary 
results from our lab suggest that there is a very similar development between age four 
and five in children’s own sense of loyalty or willingness to pay a cost to benefit their 
group (Misch, Over, & Carpenter, in preparation).  
Young children are already sensitive to a variety of inter- and intra-group 
dynamics. We know, for example, that children show a preference for their ingroup 
members over outgroup members (e.g., Nesdale & Flesser, 2001; Dunham et al., 
2011), that they trust ingroup members over outgroup members when learning new 
information (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011), that they are extremely sensitive to 
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the threat of ostracism from the group (Over & Carpenter, 2009), and that group 
membership can increase their motivation to learn group-relevant tasks (Master & 
Walton, 2013). For a successful social group, however, rules and norms are necessary 
to guide and align people's behavior. Our results extend other recent research on 
children's expectations about how group members should act (see, e.g., Abrams et al., 
2003a, 2003b, 2007, 2008, 2009; Castelli et al., 2007; Killen, Rutland, Abrams, 
Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013; Rhodes, 2012) by demonstrating that 
young children understand at least some of the obligations and norms that come with 
belonging to a group. This understanding of commitments and loyalty both helps 
children to evaluate others’ behavior, as we have seen here, and marks an important 
step in their own ability to negotiate belonging and become trustworthy and reliable 
members of their social groups.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Still shots from the test video: a) Introduction of the groups, b) Building 
towers, c) Loyal and disloyal statements of yellow group members, and d) Repetition 
of loyal and disloyal statements and still frame during test phase. 
Figure 2. Forced-choice responses for 5-year-olds in Experiment 1a. 
Figure 3. Justifications across all questions for 5-year-olds in Experiment 1a. 
Figure 4. Justifications for 5-year-olds: a) For loyal responses, b) For disloyal 
responses. 
Figure 5. Forced-choice responses for 4-year-olds in Experiment 1b. 
Figure 6. Justifications across all questions for 4-year-olds in Experiment 1b. 
Figure 7. Justifications for 4-year-olds: a) For loyal responses, b) For disloyal 
responses. 
Figure 8. Positive responses to the test questions in Experiment 2. 
Figure 9. Justifications for positive and negative responses in Experiment 2. 
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